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DIGITAL CONTRACT TRACING IN THE WORKPLACE  
Alexandra Kiosse * 
   
 






 The COVID-19 pandemic has affected the way businesses run 
and operate in the United States. With the dire need to keep 
employees safe, digital contact tracing has become the most 
efficient mechanism for controlling the spread of the virus 
within places of employment.  However, information privacy 
laws come into tension with the use of employee health data by 
employers and third parties.  This Article proposes a careful 
balance between contact tracing and maintaining employees’ 
privacy as they share health and proximity data with digital 
contact tracing applications in the workplace. 
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When the deadly smallpox virus was eliminated worldwide after 
centuries of infection, popular belief dictated that its eradication 
was due to global immunization.1  In reality, it was extensive 
 
1 History of Smallpox, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/smallpox/history/history.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2020); 
Contact Tracing, CLIMATE CHANGE AND PUB. HEALTH L. SITE AT LA. STATE 
UNIV. https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/Books/lbb/x578.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2020) 
[hereinafter Contact Tracing]. 
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contact tracing that facilitated the eradication of smallpox.2  At the 
time, contact tracing depended on a team of investigators 
interviewing the patient, along with the patient’s family, friends, 
and any other people who may have known of the patient’s close 
contacts who may have been exposed.3  The patient’s close 
contacts were discerned and were then subjected to control 
measures such as quarantine, vaccination, or treatment.4  Now, 
forty years after the success of smallpox contact tracing, digital 
contact tracing has taken over as a cost-effective and less labor-
intensive technological upgrade.5  In light of the COVID-19 
pandemic, digital contact tracing can be used to stop or slow down 
the spread of the virus.6 
 However, the emergence of digital contact tracing 
applications and mechanisms in the workplace can have far 
reaching implications for the health privacy of employees.  
Unresolved questions are raised, especially regarding whether 
employers will be able to access their employees’ location data, 
various symptoms and health information, and the data of 
employees’ close contacts.7  Digital contact tracing may also 
implicate various information privacy principles and laws, as well 
as privacy provisions found within statutes like the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Although there are privacy issues 
associated with digital contact tracing that the United States may 
not be prepared to address, employers will likely opt to use these 
mechanisms.8   
 
2 Contact Tracing, supra note 1.  
3 Digital Contact Tracing, CORONAVIRUS TODAY  
https://www.coronavirustoday.com/digital-contact-tracing (last visited Nov. 26, 
2020) [hereinafter Digital Contact Tracing].   
4 Id.  
5 Tracking COVID-19:  Contact Tracing in the Digital Age, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-
stories/detail/tracking-covid-19-contact-tracing-in-the-digital-age.  
6 Id. 
7 Digital Contact Tracing, supra note 3.  
8 Andy Green, Complete Guide to Privacy Laws in the U.S., VARONIS (March 
29, 2020), https://www.varonis.com/blog/us-privacy-laws/ (noting that there is 
no federal privacy law that can force companies to issue and comply with 
privacy policies). 
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Due to stay-at-home orders in 2020, more than half of small 
businesses in the United States had temporarily closed.9  As 
businesses began to reopen their doors, employers had the difficult 
task of preventing a COVID-19 outbreak, which would likely shut 
certain businesses down for good.10  With several big businesses 
opting for digital contact tracing to keep their workplace COVID-
19-free, as well as the release of a digital contact tracing 
application by Apple and Google, questions of privacy and 
personal health information are especially urgent.11    
 
Part I of this Article discusses the framework of information 
privacy principles that make up the privacy laws in the United 
States, examines notable regulations and statutes regarding the 
privacy of health information, and analyzes their connection to 
each other.  Part II demonstrates the potential negative impact of 
digital contact tracing tools in the workplace; namely, the potential 
threats to employee privacy.  Finally, Part III attempts to mitigate 
privacy concerns, and proposes making COVID-19 a disability 
under the ADA, passing a federal law with common information 
privacy principles incorporated, and facilitating communication 
between employers and federal and local health agencies.  
 




9 Andrew Soergel, More Than Half of Small Businesses Closed Temporarily 
Amid Coronavirus Outbreak, U.S. NEWS (May 5, 2020), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/economy/articles/2020-05-05/more-than-half-of-
small-businesses-closed-temporarily-amid-coronavirus-outbreak.  
10 See generally, Anne Sraders & Lance Lambert, Nearly 100,000 
Establishments that Temporarily Shut Down Due to the Pandemic are Now Out 
of Business, FORTUNE (Sept. 28, 2020), https://fortune.com/2020/09/28/covid-
buisnesses-shut-down-closed/.  
11 Apple and Google Partner on COVID-19 Contact Tracing Technology, APPLE 
NEWSROOM (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2020/04/apple-
and-google-partner-on-covid-19-contact-tracing-technology/; see also, Kif 
Leswing, As Workplaces Slowly Reopen, Tech Companies Smell a New Multi-
Billion Dollar Opportunity:  Helping Businesses Trace Coronavirus, CNBC 
(May 10, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/10/coronavirus-tracing-for-
workplaces-could-become-new-tech-opportunity.html.  
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 The Personal Identifiable Information (“PII”) of employees 
is protected by several different mechanisms.  These include 
information privacy principles that federal laws, federal 
regulations, and state laws are based on.12  These principles, laws, 
and regulations work concurrently with federal statutes and 
regulations geared toward medical and health information 
specifically, such as the ADA and advisory opinions and 
regulations promulgated by the Centers for Disease Control 
(“CDC”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”).  Part I.A discusses the Fair Information Practice 
Principles, notable information privacy statutes, and federal bills as 
they relate to digital contact tracing for the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Part I.B discusses the EEOC and the ADA’s protections for 
employees’ medical information.  Part I.C examines how 
employers may use digital contact tracing applications to track 
COVID-19 in the workplace and protect employees from infection.  
 
A. The Fair Information Practice Principles and U.S. Information 
Privacy Law 
 
While the U.S. Constitution protects certain aspects of privacy, and 
there are “sector- and harm-specific privacy laws,” there is no 
general comprehensive federal law governing information privacy 
in the United States.13  However, the Fair Information Practice 
Principles (“FIPPs”) act as guiding privacy values that are widely 
incorporated into United States privacy law.  
 
1.  History of the Fair Information Practice Principles  
 
The FIPPs are a set of widely accepted and internationally 
recognized principles that serve as the basis for information 
privacy policies within the government and the private sector in the 
 
12 See generally Fair Information Practice Principles, FED. TRADE COMM’N 
(Mar. 31, 2009), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20090331134113/http:/www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy
3/fairinfo.shtm.   
13 Lothar Determann, Healthy Data Protection, 26 MICH. TELECOMMS. AND 
TECH. L. REV. 229, 241 (2020).   
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United States and abroad.14  The FIPPs’ core principles were 
modeled after the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (“OECD”) Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy 
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.15  The OECD is an 
international organization geared toward shaping policy for a range 
of social and economic issues, including work on privacy policy 
and the FIPPs, which were written in 1980.16 Congress first 
incorporated the FIPPs into the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which 
promotes “accuracy, fairness, and privacy” of information in files 
of consumer reporting agencies, including credit bureaus and 
agencies that sell information about medical records, rental history 
records, and check writing histories.17 The FIPPs were also 
 
14 NAT’L PUBLIC SAFETY P’SHIP, THE FAIR INFO. PRACTICE PRINCIPLES (FIPPS) 
IN THE INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT (ISE) 1, 
https://www.nationalpublicsafetypartnership.org/Documents/The_Fair_Informat
ion_Practice_Principles_in_the_Information_Sharing_Environment.pdf =; 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008-01, PRIVACY POLICY GUIDANCE 
MEMORANDUM (2008).  The Department of Homeland Security is one of the 
federal departments and agencies that have adopted the FIPPs. Id.  
15 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [hereinafter OECD 
Guidelines] 
https://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivac
yandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2020) [hereinafter 
OECD Guidelines]; Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Jonathan Gray & Mireille 
van Eechoud, Open Data, Privacy, and Fair Information Principles:  Towards A 
Balancing Framework, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 2073, 2102 (2015); see 
Members and Partners, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners (last visited Oct. 3, 2020) for a 
list of OECD member countries.  The OECD, an intergovernmental economic 
organization with thirty-seven member countries, expanded on the original 
four FIPPs and adopted a more comprehensive version of eight principles in 
1980. Id.; Erin Corken, The Changing Expectation of Privacy:  Keeping Up with 
the Millennial Generation and Looking Toward the Future, 42 N. KY. L. REV. 
287, 291 (2015).  
16 OECD Privacy Guidelines, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/digital/ieconomy/privacy-guidelines.htm (last visited Nov 
22, 2020).  
17 Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2012)); see FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, A SUMMARY OF YOUR RIGHTS UNDER THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING 
ACT, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0096-fair-credit-reporting-
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incorporated into the Privacy Act of 1974, which established fair 
information practices governing “the collection, maintenance, use, 
and dissemination of information” maintained in federal agency 
records.18  Years later, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and 
the Obama Administration called for FIPPs-centered privacy 
regulation in the public and private sectors.19  Through studies of 
methods implemented by entities to collect, use, and safeguard 
personal information, the FIPPs continued to evolve.20  Now the 
FIPPs are widely utilized by various federal agencies and are used 
as the framework for state privacy laws.  The five commonly 
accepted FIPPs in the United States, as formulated by the FTC, 
include: (1) notice/awareness; (2) choice/ consent; (3) access/ 
participation; (4) integrity/ security; and (5) enforcement/ redress.21  
 
act.pdf (last visited 11/5/2020) for more information about the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act.  
18 5 U.S.C. § 552a; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, 
https://www.justice.gov/opcl/privacy-act-1974 (last updated Jan. 15, 2020); 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008-02, PRIVACY POLICY GUIDANCE 
MEMORANDUM (2008). 
19 See generally Borgesius et al., supra note 15, at 2101–08, for the background 
and history of the FIPPs in the United States and abroad; OFF. OF THE 
PRESIDENT, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE 
GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY (2012); FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING 
CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012); OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. 
OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB MEMORANDUM M-13-13, OPEN DATA POLICY – 
MANAGING INFORMATION AS AN ASSET (May 9, 2013) (delineating 
implementation guidance material for former President Obama's 2013 executive 
order).  
20 Nicholas Camillo & Devika Kornbacher, Fair Information Practice Principles 
in Data Privacy Law, 2019 ADVANCED INTELL. PROP. L. 3.2, 2019 WL 8275404.  
21 Fair Information Practice Principles, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 31, 2009), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20090331134113/http:/www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy
3/fairinfo.shtm.  The five FIPPs that will be discussed in this Artcileote are 
formulated by the FTC as the principles common to all regulations and guidance 
related to the FIPPs. Id.; cf. Corken, supra note 15, at 291 (citing OECD 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data, Org. Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacy
an); cf. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., The Fair Information Practice Principles at 
Work (June 2011), 
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Data minimization is also a common principle used to rein in 
entities’ data collection policies.22  
 
2. The Fair Information Practice Principles Explained 
 
The notice and awareness principle dictates that individuals should 
receive notice of an entity’s information practices prior to the 
collection of their personal information.23 This ensures that 
individuals can make informed decisions as to whether to disclose 
the information sought, and to what extent to disclose it.24  The 
FTC recommends the issuance of understandable and concise 
privacy notices divulging the identification of the entity collecting 
the data, the uses of the data, the recipients of the data, the nature 
and means of the data collection, and the steps taken to ensure 
confidentiality, integrity, and quality of the data.25 Entities may 
also be required to identify any choice individuals have regarding 
the use of their data, their rights to access the data and correct any 
inaccuracies, and the availability of redress for violations of the 
respective information privacy policy.26 Meaningful notice and 
 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/dhsprivacy_fippsfactsheet.p
df (discussing the FIPPs as formulated and utilized in DHS privacy practices).  
22 Data Minimization, TREND MICRO, 
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/definition/Data-Minimization 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2020).  
23 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE:  A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1998), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-
congress/priv-23a.pdf [hereinafter A Report to Congress]. 
24 Id.; Corken, supra note 15, at 290. 
25 See, e.g., A Report to Congress, supra note 23; Ben Davis, GDPR:  How to 
create best practice privacy notices (with examples) (July 17, 2017), 
https://econsultancy.com/gdpr-best-practice-privacy-notices-examples/.  The 
GDPR is the European Union’s privacy and security law utilizing data 
protection principles similar to the FIPPs, including transparency to individuals. 
Ben Wolford, What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law?, 
https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/?cn-reloaded=1 (last visited Dec. 5, 2020).  
26 A Report to Congress, supra note 23; David Hoffman & Paula J. Bruening, 
Rethinking Privacy: Fair Information Practice Principles Reinterpreted 13–14, 
INTEL, https://bigdata.fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Intel-Rethinking-
Privacy.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2020); see also Woodrow Hartzog, The 
Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV. 952, 980 
(2017) (noting that design, in addition to words, should also be considered when 
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awareness is required for the application of the remaining four 
FIPPs.  Without it, individuals do not have knowledge regarding 
the use of their data, and thus are powerless to control it.27 
 The second FIPP, choice and consent, refers to individuals’ 
ability to determine how any personal information collected from 
them can be used, especially regarding secondary uses of 
information.28 Secondary uses of personal information are any uses 
beyond those “necessary to complete the contemplated 
transaction,” including internal use within the entity or external 
use, when data is transferred to a third party.29  Entities may apply 
opt-in or opt-out regimes to their privacy policies.30 Opt-in regimes 
require individuals to affirmatively allow the collection and use of 
their information, and opt-out, or tacit consent, regimes require 
individuals to affirmatively forbid the collection and use of such 
information for internal or external uses.31 Within these regimes, 
entities can offer individuals greater choice by allowing them to 
tailor the nature of the information collected and the uses that 
information will be put to by specifying their preferences.32 
 The access and participation principle refers to individuals’ 
ability to access their own data, and to contest the accuracy or 
completeness of it.33  The FTC recommends that access be timely, 
inexpensive, and relatively simple to give individuals a meaningful 
 
deciding if the notice given was sufficient).  
27 See, e.g., A Report to Congress, supra note 23; Steven Hetcher, The FTC as 
Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041, 2049 n.29 (2000).  
28 A Report to Congress, supra note 23. 
29 Id.; see also Thomas Gallagher, Kudakwashe Dube & Scott McLachlan, 
Ethical Issues in Secondary Use of Personal Health Information (May 2018), 
https://cmte.ieee.org/futuredirections/tech-policy-ethics/may2018/ethical-issues-
in-secondary-use-of-personal-health-information/ (discussing how personal 
health information may be used by third parties). 
30 A Report to Congress, supra note 23. 
31 Id.; Jan Bouckaert & Hans Degryse, Opt In Versus Opt Out: A Free-Entry 
Analysis of Privacy Policies (Dec. 16, 2005), 
https://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2006/docs/34.pdf.  
32 A Report to Congress, supra note 23. 
33 Id.; Pam Dixon, A Brief Introduction to Fair Information Practices (June 5, 
2006), https://www.worldprivacyforum.org/2008/01/report-a-brief-introduction-
to-fair-information-practices/ (discussing the access/participation principle 
under the name “individual participation”).  
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ability to see and change the data that was collected.34   
 The integrity and security principle recommends that data 
collectors take reasonable steps to ensure data integrity and protect 
against loss, unauthorized access, use, destruction, and disclosure 
of data.35  This can be achieved by using reputable sources of data, 
complying with the access and participation principle to allow 
correction, destroying untimely data, and limiting third party 
access through the encryption and secure storage of collected 
information.36 
 Finally, enforcement and redress ensures that the FIPPs are 
implemented and individuals can obtain relief for violations.37  
These goals may be met by: (1) self-regulation, (2) government 
enforcement, and (3) private remedies.38  Self-regulation in entities 
can include audits, which allow entities to link the misuse of 
information collected to a particular source.39 This allows victims 
to get recourse and acts as a deterrent against the data abuser.40  
With an auditing mechanism, entities can investigate and 
compensate individuals for the harm suffered by the unauthorized 
collection or misuse of their information.41 Government 
enforcement via federal agencies or legislation is also a means to 
redress data misuse and other data violations.42  Such enforcement 
 
34 A Report to Congress, supra note 23. 
35 Id.; Dixon, supra note 33 (defining the integrity/security principle under the 
name “security safeguards principle”).  
36 A Report to Congress, supra note 23; see also NATIONAL PUBLIC SAFETY 
PARTNERSHIP, supra note 14.  
37 A Report to Congress, supra note 23; Steven Hetcher, Changing the Social 
Meaning of Privacy in Cyberspace, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 149, 182 (2001).  
38 A Report to Congress, supra note 23.  
39 Id. 
40 Id.; FED. TRADE COMM’N, INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE SERVICES – A REPORT TO 
CONGRESS (1997).  
41 A Report to Congress, supra note 23.  
42 Id.; U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, SEC'S ADVISORY COMM. 
ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYSTEMS, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS 
OF CITIZENS (1973) https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=479784 [hereinafter 
RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS] (advocating for the 
inception of a federal agency to regulate the use of all automated personal data 
systems); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE 
TASK FORCE, INFO. POLICY COMM., PRIV. WORKING GROUP, PRIVACY AND THE 
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often comes from the FTC, which can levy penalties for unfair data 
practices.43  Finally, private litigants can similarly rely on a 
statutory scheme that provides private rights to litigate.44 
Individuals harmed by the violation of information privacy 
practices or unfair data collection could thus recover via 
compensatory or punitive damages.45   
 Data minimization, as another regulatory principle related 
to privacy policy, involves limiting data collection to only what is 
required to fulfill a specific purpose.46  Essentially, the principle 
requires that entities use only the least amount of data possible.  
With regard to contact tracing applications, this would require only 
the use of proximity data for the purpose of informing other users 
of the application that they had been in close contact with someone 
who tested positive or exhibited symptoms of COVID-19.47  
 
3. Notable State Privacy Statutes and Bills  
 
The five FIPPs are interrelated and work together in information 
privacy regulations, statutes, and policies binding federal agencies 
and private entities.  Several states have adopted information 
privacy laws including the California Consumer Privacy Act 
(“CCPA”).48  Moreover, other states are entertaining bills that 
 
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING AND 
USING PERSONAL INFORMATION (1995), https://aspe.hhs.gov/privacy-and-
national-information-infrastructure-principles-providing-and-using-personal-
information (noting regulatory enforcement and criminal prosecution as options 
for redress).  
43 FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on 
Facebook, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jul. 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penalty-sweeping-new-
privacy-restrictions.  
44 A Report to Congress, supra note 23.; RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE 
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, supra note 42 (discussing the need for federal legislation 
and advocating for uniform state legislation). 
45A Report to Congress, supra note 23. 
46 Data Minimization, supra note 22. 
47 Johannes Abeler et al., COVID-19 Contact Tracing and Data Protection Can 
Go Together (Apr. 20,2020), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7173240/.  
48 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2020). 
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resemble the CCPA.49  
 The CCPA applies to for-profit companies that do business 
in California, have a gross revenue of over twenty-five million 
dollars, buy, receive, or sell personal information of fifty thousand 
or more California residents, households, or devices, or derive 50 
percent or more of their annual revenue from selling the personal 
information of California residents.50  The CCPA operates via an 
opt-out regime, in which individuals have the right to delete 
personal information, request that entities not use personal 
information, and obtain notice regarding the type of personal 
information collected and how it is being used.51  Any contract 
provision attempting to waive these rights is unenforceable.52  
Under the CCPA, personal information is broadly defined as 
information that “identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably 
capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, 
directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”53  
As such, the CCPA includes employment related information.54  
As per new regulations that went into effect in August 2020, the 
CCPA requires entities to provide consumers with timely notice at 
the collection of data that should be understandable to consumers 
and inform them of the categories of data to be collected.55  The 
notices must use plain, non-legal language, draw the consumers’ 
attention to the notice, be available in multiple languages, and be 
accessible to viewers with disabilities.56  Moreover, entities cannot 
collect data which the consumer was not given notice of, and 
consumers must be informed of their right to opt-out of 
collection.57 
 Following California’s lead, New York and Massachusetts 
 
49 See S. 5642, 242d Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); S. 120, 191st Sess. (Mass. 2019).  
50 CIV. § 1798.140(c). 
51 CIV. § 1798.100. 
52 CIV. § 1798.192. 
53 CIV. § 1798.140(o)(1). 
54 Id. at § 1798.140(o)(1)(I). 
55 California Consumer Privacy Act Regulations, 
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/oal-sub-final-text-of-
regs.pdf? (last visited Dec. 20, 2020).  
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
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have proposed statutes that resemble the CCPA.  New York’s 
proposed privacy statute features the right to delete personal 
information, and request to see the personal information collected 
by an entity, like the CCPA.58  Unlike the CCPA however, the 
proposed New York Privacy Act does not have a revenue threshold 
for businesses, creates a fiduciary relationship between businesses 
and the individuals whose data is used, and allows individuals to 
correct inaccurate information.59  The proposed New York law was 
not passed in 2019, and is on “hold” as of October 2020.60  The 
Massachusetts bill also shares language from the CCPA, and 
includes access to personal information, the right to delete 
information, the right to opt-out of the sale of information, and 
guaranteed notice of privacy rights.61  Unlike the CCPA however, 
the Massachusetts bill provides a broader right of redress for 
individuals, regardless of monetary loss.62   
 
4. Federal Privacy Bills 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has created a need for strong data 
privacy laws in collaboration with longstanding statutes that 
govern health information in the workforce, such as the ADA.63  In 
response, there are two bills before Congress: the Public Health 
Emergency Privacy Act (“PHEPA”),64 and the COVID-19 
Consumer Data Protection Act (“CCDPA”)65.   
 The PHEPA governs any federal or private entity that 
 
58 S. 5642, 242d Leg. Sess. § 1103(3)(a) (N.Y. 2019) 
59 Id. 
60 Joanna Kessler, Note, Data Protection in the Wake of the GDPR: California’s 
Solution for Protecting “The World’s Most Valuable Resource”, 93 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 99, 126 (2019) (citing Tim Sandle, New York Lawmakers Reject 




61 S. 120, 191st Sess. (Mass. 2019).  
62 Id. 
63 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117. 
64 H.R. 6866, 116th Cong. (2020).  
65 S. 3663, 116th Cong. (2020).  
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“collects, uses, or discloses emergency health data” or that 
develops a website or an application for the purposes of contact 
tracing.66  The proposed act incorporates several FIPPs.  Data 
minimization is required to ensure that an entity only collects, uses, 
and discloses data that is “necessary, proportionate, and limited for 
a good faith public health purpose.”67  The access and participation 
principle in PHEPA ensures that the information collected by 
entities is accurate and that inaccurate information can be corrected 
by individuals.68  Finally, reasonable safeguards are included in the 
bill to prevent unlawful discrimination on the basis of the health 
data collected.69  The proposed act allows the disclosure of health 
data to the government when the disclosure is made to a public 
health authority in good faith.70  Additionally, PHEPA prohibits 
the withholding of employment opportunities on the basis of 
emergency health data, requires express consent and clear and 
conspicuous notice, and creates private and regulatory forms of 
redress for violations of PHEPA.71 
 The CCDPA is much less broad.  It prohibits entities from 
collecting, processing, or transferring covered data, including 
geolocation, proximity, identifiers, and personal health 
information, unless the entity provides prior notice and the 
individual expressly consents.72  It also provides that entities must 
publish a clear and conspicuous privacy policy, practice data 
minimization, offer a right to delete and correct data, and establish 
a reasonable security mechanism.73  Unlike the PHEPA, the 
CCDPA offers no private right of action, and preempts state law, 
so that states cannot pass any laws related to the “collection, 
processing, or transfer of covered data” involving tracking the 
spread of COVID-19, measuring compliance with social distancing 
guidelines, and conducting contact tracing.74  The CCDPA also 
 
66 H.R. 6866 § 2(4)(A). 
67 H.R. 6866 § 3(a)(1)–(3). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 H.R. 6866 § 3(a)(4). 
71 H.R. 6866 §§ 3(b)–(e), 6. 
72 S. 3663, 116th Cong. § 3(a) (2020). 
73 S. 3663 § 3(d)–(h). 
74 S. 3663 § 4(b)(3), § 3(b). 
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does not apply to data collected by employers.75 
 According to Skopos Labs, Inc., which predicts the 
probability that a bill will pass both chambers of Congress, the 
PHEPA and the CCDPA each have only a two percent chance of 
enactment.76   However, some experts say that there is a chance 
that one of the bills will pass.77  Large technology companies, 
including Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, and Google, have 
expressed their support for comprehensive federal privacy law.78  
 
B. THE EEOC AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
 
Besides the FIPPs, federal agencies and laws must also be 
considered when thinking about information privacy law as it 
relates to health information. The EEOC and the ADA are relevant 
for the purposes of creating a contact tracing application that does 
not infringe on individuals’ right to health privacy.  
 The EEOC is a federal agency responsible for 
enforcing laws prohibiting discrimination in hiring practices on the 
basis of “race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, 
and genetic information.”79  Laws enforced by the EEOC apply to 
hiring, firing, promotions, harassment, training, wages, and 
employee benefits.80 Among the laws and regulations enforced by 
the EEOC, the ADA is one of the most important protections for 
employees.81  The ADA requires employers to reasonably 
accommodate employees with statutory disabilities and to refrain 
from discriminating against prospective and current employees on 
 
75 S. 3663 § 2(12)(B), § 3(b). 
76 H.R. 6866, 116th Cong.; S. 3633, 116th Cong.  
77 Thomas Germain, New Privacy Bills Aim to Protect Health Data During the 
Pandemic, CONSUMER REPORTS (May 14, 2020), 
https://www.consumerreports.org/health-privacy/dueling-coronavirus-privacy-
bills-could-protect-your-data-during-the-pandemic/. 
78 Mitchell Noordyke, Big Tech’s Shift to Privacy, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIV. PROS., 
https://iapp.org/resources/article/big-techs-shift-to-privacy-2/ (last visited Dec. 
5, 2020).  
79 Overview, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/overview (last visited Sept. 20, 2020).  
80 Id. 
81 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. 
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the basis of disability.82  Although the ADA does not specifically 
name all of the impairments that constitute disabilities, it defines 
individuals with disabilities as having “a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities,” “a record of such impairment,” or describes those who 
are “regarded as having such an impairment.”83  An individual may 
establish that they have a disability and are entitled to be covered 
pursuant to the ADA under one or more of these prongs.84  Under 
the first prong, the standard “substantially limits” is meant to be 
construed broadly and is not a demanding standard.85  Generally, 
this standard refers to activities that are substantially limited as 
compared to most people in the population.  An impairment need 
not “prevent, or significantly or severely restrict” an individual 
from performing a major life activity, but rather less drastic 
interruptions to daily life can be considered substantially 
limiting.86  Further, an impairment can be labelled a disability even 
when there are no symptoms.  In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Human Immunodeficiency Virus is a 
disability, even before the onset of the symptomatic phase of the 
virus, holding that certain major life activities, such as the ability 
to reproduce, may still be substantially limited.87   
 The EEOC has not stated whether it will consider COVID-
19 to be a disability under the ADA; however, states with 
relatively more expansive disability protections, including New 
York, have labelled the virus a disability, and there has been at 
least one lawsuit requesting that it be considered as such.88  In 
 
82 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). 
83 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1); see also UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INFORMATION AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ON THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, https://www.ada.gov/ada_intro.htm (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2020). 
84 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(2). 
85 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i).  
86 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). 
87 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998); 42 U.S.C § 12102(1); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(h)(2)(i).  
88 Is COVID19 A Disability Under Discrimination Law? The Next Wave of 
Workplace Lawsuits May Answer Questions, FISHER PHILLIPS (June 19, 2020) 
https://www.fisherphillips.com/resources-alerts-is-covid-19-a-
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Tihara Worthy v. Wellington Estates, an employee alleged that she 
was wrongfully terminated and prevented from returning to work 
because of her previous COVID-19 positive status.89  The plaintiff 
sought to have COVID-19 be considered a disability under New 
Jersey law.90  The ADA restricts an employer’s ability to ask 
potential or current employees about their disabilities and to 
require medical examinations.91  It also prohibits employers from 
excluding individuals with disabilities unless they pose a 
significant risk of harm to other employees within the company,92 
and requires reasonable accommodations for individuals with 
disabilities during epidemics and contagious viral outbreaks, 
including permitting working from home.93    
 Although it is unclear whether COVID-19 will be 
considered a statutory disability, protections still exist for those 
who contract the virus.94  For example, leave must be provided to 
employees who test positive for COVID-19.95  The ADA also 
limits inquiries into the health of employees and the medical 
examinations that employers are able to conduct.96  EEOC laws 
continued to apply during the COVID-19 pandemic, and it had 
continued to issue guidance regarding permissible treatment by 
employers during the COVID-19 pandemic.  The EEOC has issued 
 
disability-under-discrimination [hereinafter Workplace Lawsuits]; U.S. 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 27, 
2020 OUTREACH WEBINAR (2020).   
89 See Workplace Lawsuits, supra note 88 (discussing Tihara Worthy v. 
Wellington Estates LLC).  This case has been filed in the New Jersey Superior 
Court on June 15, 2020; COVID-19 as a Covered Disability under New Jersey 
Law, MASHEL LAW, LLC (Aug. 31, 2020), 
https://www.newjerseyemploymentattorneysblog.com/covid-19-as-a-covered-
disability-under-new-jersey-law/.   
90 Workplace Lawsuits, supra note 88.  
91 Id. 
92 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(3), (8); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(r), 1630.15(b)(2). 
93 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5); see also § 12111(3); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); Strass v. 
Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic, 744 A. 2d 1000, 1007 (D.C. 2000) 
(noting that a reasonable accommodation can include job restructuring and 
reassignment to a vacant position).   
94 Id.   
95 Id. 
96 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). 
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guidance concerning potentially permissible medical examinations 
under the ADA in light of the pandemic, clarifying that 
temperature screenings and requirements to receive a negative 
COVID-19 test are allowed,97 but tests for anti-bodies constitute 
impermissible medical examinations because they do not meet the 
ADA’s standards.98 The EEOC has noted that COVID-19 
constitutes a “direct threat” under the ADA, allowing employers to 
make more “robust medical inquiries than would normally be 
allowed.”99  However, EEOC guidance is preempted by CDC 
guidance and state public health authorities.100   
 The ADA also offers guidance about storing employee 
medical information, including employee statements regarding the 
status of their COVID-19 infection or their suspicion of 
infection.101  Additionally, employers may disclose the name and 
PII of employees suffering from COVID-19 to public health 
agencies, such as a state’s Department of Health or the CDC.102  
However, employers may not specifically name the infected 
employee to other employees, but may generally inform others that 
there was a positive case within their vicinity.103  This makes 
contact tracing applications popular tools for tracking the positive 
 
97 What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation 
Act, and Other EEO Laws, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Sept. 8, 2020) 
[hereinafter What You Should Know About COVID-19] 
https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-
rehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-laws.  
98 See id.; see also Conroy v. New York State Department of Correctional 
Services, 333 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that medical examinations 
cannot be required unless such examination is shown to be “job-related and 
consistent with business necessity”).  
99 Taylor Eric White et al., Employer Use of Contact Tracing Apps: The Good, 
the Bad, and the Regulatory, LEXBLOG (July 7, 2020), 
https://www.lexblog.com/2020/07/07/employer-use-of-contact-tracing-apps-the-
good-the-bad-and-the-regulatory/ (citing Pandemic Preparedness in the 
Workplace and the Americans with Disabilities Act, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N (Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pandemic-
preparedness-workplace-and-americans-disabilities-act).   
100 What You Should Know About COVID-19, supra note 97.  
101 Joan Farrell, Testing, Exams, and Medical Information, ADA COMPLIANCE 
GUIDE ¶ 133 (2020), Westlaw 10992547. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. 
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spread of COVID-19 among employees within a company.104 
 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(“OSHA”) is a large regulatory agency under the United States 
Department of Labor, and has worked with the EEOC and the 
ADA to help maintain safe work environments during the COVID-
19 pandemic.105  Under OSHA’s general duty clause, employers 
must provide a place of employment that is “free from recognized 
hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious 
physical harm”, and this includes protection from COVID-19 
infection during work.106  Although contact tracing is not explicitly 
mentioned in published guidelines for employers, OSHA 
recommends a combination of the use of personal protective 
equipment (“PPE”), administrative controls such as changes in 
work schedules to stagger employee arrival, and engineering 
controls such as installing products to minimize the spread of 
viruses, thereby implicitly allowing contact tracing to be 
utilized.107   
 The CDC has also published guidance regarding digital 
contact tracing, including that data should be “secure and 
confidential, be able to receive input from public health authorities, 
facilitate identification of known contacts, and be able to send 
notifications of exposure in multiple electronic formats.”108 
 
C. The Use of Contact Tracing Applications to Monitor the Spread 
of Respiratory Illness 
 
Considering the guidance of the EEOC and health agencies, 
contact tracing can be instituted in the workplace.  Employers may 
seek to keep their workplaces safe and abide by CDC guidelines by 
using contact tracing through the use of web and mobile 
 
104 Id. 
105 See generally COVID-19, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., 
https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/covid-19/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2020). 
106 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1970); OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., NO. 
3990-03 2020, GUIDANCE ON PREPARING WORKPLACES FOR COVID-19, 4 
(2020) [hereinafter OSHA Guidance] (noting that the General Duty clause 
applies to the COVID-19 pandemic).  
107 OSHA Guidance, supra note 106. 
108 White et al., supra note 99. 
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applications to identify, track, and warn the close contacts of 
infected employees.109  
 Contact tracing applications typically work by using 
Bluetooth or GPS technology to constantly broadcast strings of 
random numbers.110  These numbers are broadcasted anonymously 
and change every few minutes.111   When two electronic devices 
(such as cell phones) that have the application downloaded are in 
close contact for a specified amount of time, the two devices 
exchange their series of numbers and store these numbers within 
each phone’s application.112  When a user of an application tests 
positive for COVID-19, the application can let other users know 
that they were previously in close contact with someone who tested 
positive or exhibited symptoms of the virus.113  Within the private 
sector, contact tracing applications may also link proximity or 
geolocation data with certain “personally identifiable information 
such as names and contact information.”114  In the employment 
context, applications can be used for both contact tracing within 
the company, and to ensure that employees abide by social 
distancing guidelines and other workplace rules.115  When an 
employee contracts the virus, the application can inform other 
employees that they may have been exposed to the virus based on 
their physical location and proximity to the infected co-worker.116 
These applications, which have already been used in 
several countries, by several U.S. states, and by various businesses 
 
109 Kelly Servick, Cellphone Tracking Could Help Stem the Spread of 
Coronavirus. Is Privacy the Price?, SCIENCE MAG (Mar. 22, 
2020), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/03/cellphone-tracking-could-
help-stem-spread-coronavirus-privacy-price.  
110 See, e.g., Stephen R. Brown et al., May an Employer Require the Use of a 




114 JONES DAY, A GUIDE TO NAVIGATING CYBERSECURITY, PRIVACY, AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW ISSUES WITH COVID-19 CONTACT TRACING IN THE PRIVATE 
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in the United States,117 may share proximity and geolocation 
tracking data to either a centralized or decentralized source.118  
Centralized methods use a computer server to match data and alert 
users, while the decentralized method stores data exclusively in 
each individual’s phone.119 Adopting the decentralized method 
renders a server powerless  because Bluetooth tracking does not 
require personal information and leaves no trail back to users.120  
However, a centralized system involves the use and storage of 
personal data, and “puts the server in a position of trust, where it 
won’t misuse” that personal information.121  In other words, unlike 
a centralized model, a decentralized model would not tell an 
employee using the application where they were exposed.122  
Notably, the centralized model has been criticized on cybersecurity 
grounds as being easier to hack and manipulate.123 
 Although the ADA has not specifically commented on the 
 
117 See Patrick Howell O’Neill et al., A flood of coronavirus apps are tracking 
us.  Now it’s time to keep track of them, MIT TECH. REV. (May 7, 2020), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/07/1000961/launching-mittr-covid-
tracing-tracker/, for a database of countries using a COVID-19 contact tracing 
application; see Jefferson Graham, Tracking coronavirus: Are Apple and Google 
contact tracing apps available in your state?, USA TODAY, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2020/10/02/apple-google-coronavirus-
contact-tracing-apps/3592355001/ (Oct. 5, 2020, 2:06 AM), for the states that 
are using contact tracing applications; see Shannon Bond, Your Boss May Soon 
Track You At Work for Coronavirus Safety, NPR (May 8, 2020, 2:48 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/05/08/852896051/your-boss-may-soon-track-you-at-
work-for-coronavirus-safety, for general information about contact tracing 
applications in the workplace.  
118 Daniel Kahn Gillmor, ACLU White Paper – Principles for Technology-
Assisted Contact-Tracing, AMERICAN CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, (Apr. 16, 
2020), https://www.aclu.org/report/aclu-white-paper-principles-technology-
assisted-contact-tracing; Joseph Duball, Centralized vs. decentralized: EU’s 
contact tracing privacy conundrum, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIV. PROS. (Apr. 28, 
2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/centralized-vs-decentralized-eus-contact-tracing-
privacy-conundrum/.  
119 Leo Kelion, NHS rejects Apple-Google coronavirus app plan, BBC News 
(Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52441428.  
120 Duball, supra note 118. 
121 Id. 
122 Gillmor, supra note 118. 
123 Id.  
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use of contact tracing, use of contract tracing applications would 
likely not be prohibited by the ADA provided that the application 
is not more intrusive than necessary to meet the business necessity 
standard.124  To meet the business necessity standard, an employer 
that intends to require a medical examination must reasonably 
believe that an employee’s behavior is a threat to vital functions of 
the business based on objective evidence.125 A COVID-19 
infection in the workplace would potentially create such a threat, 
as it can put employees at risk for contracting the virus.   The way 
the applications will be implemented, however, will be almost 
entirely within each employer’s control.126  Under OSHA’s 
General Duty Clause,127 employers must provide a safe work 
environment, and COVID-19 has been labelled a disease that 
triggers employers’ duties to take affirmative actions to reduce 
COVID-19 related hazards.128  Along with guidance from OSHA 
and state and local health authorities, employers can implement 
additional precautions, such as contact tracing.129   
 
II.  DATA USE AND MISUSE 
 
 Outside of their immediate homes and communities, 
Americans come across the most social interaction, and thus their 
greatest potential exposure to COVID-19, at their workplace.130  
 
124 GOING BACK TO WORK: EMPLOYER USE OF “APPS” ON EMPLOYEE PDAS/SMART 
PHONES FOR COVID-19 CONTACT TRACING, ROPES & GRAY (MAY 1, 2020), 
https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2020/05/Going-Back-to-Work-
Employer-Use-of-Apps-on-Employee-PDAs-Smart-Phones-for-COVID-19-
Contact-Tracing; see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(D)(4)(A). 
125 William Goren, Job Relatedness and Business Necessity Revisited (Jan. 5, 
2018), https://www.understandingtheada.com/blog/2018/01/05/ada-job-related-
business-necessity/ (citing Painter v. Illinois Department of Transportation, 715 
Fed. Appx. 538, 541 (7th Cir. 2017)).  
126 Id.  
127 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  
128 White et al., supra note 99. 
129 Id. (noting that OSHA requires that employers implement some combination 
of Personal Protective Equipment, cloth face coverings, administrative controls, 
and engineering controls).  
130 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, POSITION/ POLICY STATEMENT - CONTACT 
TRACING, https://nsc.org/getattachment/72ee1419-3d6b-41e2-a614-
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Identifying infected employees, tracking their contacts at work, 
and sharing the information with public health agencies like the 
CDC can help to minimize exposure in the workplace and in the 
country as a whole, especially considering the fact that the United 
States lacks a national contact tracing mechanism.131  There are no 
federal or state laws prohibiting employers from using contact 
tracing applications, and they can be readily initiated at workplaces 
around the United States.132   
 However, while digital contact tracing can be highly 
effective at controlling COVID-19 outbreaks,133 provided that 
approximately 60 percent of the population installs a contact 
tracing application,134 many Americans are worried about the 
implications of a contact tracing application at work.135  Part II.A 
will examine privacy considerations and concerns as they relate to 
digital contact tracing applications.  Part II.B discusses the 
potential for discrimination based on COVID-19 symptoms or 
infection through the use of digital contact tracing.  Part II.C 




132 White et al., supra note 99.  
133 MATT J. KEELING, T. DEIRDRE HOLLINGSWORTH & JONATHAN M. READ, 
EFFICACY OF CONTACT TRACING FOR THE CONTAINMENT OF THE 2019 NOVEL 
CORONAVIRUS 861 (COVID-19) (2020).  
134 Digital contact tracing can slow or even stop coronavirus transmission and 
ease us out of lockdown, UNIV. OF OXFORD. (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://www.research.ox.ac.uk/Article/2020-04-16-digital-contact-tracing-can-
slow-or-even-stop-coronavirus-transmission-and-ease-us-out-of-lockdown (“We 
can stop the epidemic if approximately 60% of the whole population use the app 
and adhere to the app’s recommendations. Lower numbers of app users will also 
have a positive effect; we estimate that one infection will be averted for every 
one to two users.”); see also Sidney Fussell & Will Knight, The Apple-
Google Contact  Tracing Plan Won't Stop Covid Alone, WIRED (Apr. 14, 2020), 
https://www.wired.com/story/apple-google-contact-tracing-wont-stop-covid-
alone/ (noting that a successful contact tracing application needs fifty to seventy 
percent of the population to participate).  
135 Digital Contact Tracing, CORONAVIRUS TODAY, 
https://www.coronavirustoday.com/digital-contact-tracing (noting that in an 
online survey of 2000 people, 71 percent said they would not download a 
contact tracing application, and 44 percent of that group cited privacy concerns 
as the main reason).  
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COVID-19 pandemic and the personal health information of 
employees.  
 
A. Information Privacy Considerations 
 
 Major privacy concerns related to digital contact tracing 
include whether employees will have sufficient notice and means 
to choose and consent to digital contact tracing within the 
workplace, the quality and standardization of the data collected 
through contact tracing applications, and how the information 
collected will be used and to whom it will be shared. 
 
1.  Choice/Consent and Notice/Awareness 
 
 Whether privacy policies for digital applications used by 
employers will adopt the common FIPPs is an important 
consideration for those who worry about the safety and security of 
their personal information, particularly in regard to the notice and 
awareness, and the choice and consent principles.136  Without the 
meaningful application of the notice and awareness principle in a 
digital contact tracing application, employees may not get a 
sufficient amount of information about the collection and use of 
their personal information.137  
Notice is also particularly important because, without it, 
individuals cannot constructively consent to privacy policies.  In 
Opperman v. Path Inc., the Northern District Court of California 
found that there were material issues of fact as to the scope of 
consent obtained by Yelp Inc. and whether there was sufficient 
consent for Yelp Inc.’s practice of uploading users’ phone 
contacts.138  The court noted that consent is only effective if the 
user agreed “to the particular conduct, or to substantially the same 
 
136 Aaron M. Baird, Kellen Mermin-Bunnell & Jacon Lesandrini, Ethics of 
Digital Contact Tracing by U.S. Employers during the COVID-19 Pandemic, 
HEALTH MGMT. POL’Y & INNOVATION (Apr. 30, 2020), 
https://hmpi.org/2020/04/30/ethics-of-digital-contact-tracing-by-u-s-employers-
during-the-covid-19-pandemic-4-30-gsu-and-wellstar/. 
137 Camillo & Kornbacher, supra note 20, at 3.2-III.  
138 Opperman v. Path Inc., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
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conduct,” and that Yelp, Inc. did not explicitly mention that it 
would upload contact information.139  Similarly, with the changing 
guidelines on sharing positive COVID-19 cases, employers would 
be unable to give adequate notice and could not solicit consent 
from employees.140  Thus, employers may not have the ability to 
give notice of potential government and third party uses of the data 
collected from employees, and employees may not have the 
meaningful choice to resist the third party uses.141  Without proper 
and conspicuous notice, employees cannot meaningfully consent to 
the use and disclosure of their PII, regardless of whether the 
application in question utilizes an opt-in or opt-out model of 
consent.142  Moreover, it is likely that applications will require 
blanket consent at the outset due to the ongoing nature of 
employees’ engagement with contact tracing applications.143  This 
means that employees may be expected to consent broadly to 
future data disclosure and uses without fully understanding them.  
In other words, “because the consequences of granting blanket 
consent to use one's PII cannot be known at the time the consent is 
granted, this mechanism does not allow an individual to exercise 
meaningful control over disposition of his PII.”144 
 There are a number of concerns relating to 
notice/awareness and choice/consent regardless of whether the use 
of a digital application is mandated or completely voluntary.  In the 
absence of federal information privacy law on this matter, it is 
unknown whether employers can mandate the participation in 
 
139 Id. at 1077.  
140 Camillo & Kornbacher, supra note 20, at 3.2-III; U.S. Department of Labor 
Issues Enforcement Guidance For Recording Cases of COVID-19, 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN. NATIONAL NEWS RELEASE (U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor, Washington, D.C.), April 10, 2020 [hereinafter OSHA NEWS 
RELEASE]. 
141 Camillo & Kornbacher, supra note 20, at 3.2-III; OSHA NEWS RELEASE, 
supra note 140. 
142 John A. Rothchild, Against Notice and Choice:  The Manifest Failure of the 
Proceduralist Paradigm to Protect Privacy Online (Or Anywhere Else), 66 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559, 633 (2018).  
143 Id.; Brown et al., supra note 110. 
144 Rothchild, supra note 142. 
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digital contact tracing.145  However, it is not expressly 
forbidden.146  Mandatory use of contact tracing applications will 
effectively remove employees’ ability to consent completely, 
because the privacy policies will be completely at the judgment of 
employers.  Even if the application is facially voluntary, incentives 
and coercion may unduly influence employees to participate.  
Because of a perceived or actual lack of choice regarding the use 
of an application, employees may be stripped of the ability to 
meaningfully exercise choice and give consent, especially 
considering the tough economic climate, riddled with business 
closures and layoffs during the COVID-19 pandemic.147  
Conversely, some experts note that contact tracing technology will 
be significantly less effective if employees are able to opt-in or 
opt-out of using the technology and sharing their data.148  This is 
because a significant number of employees must participate in 
digital contact tracing for it to be effective, and if too many 
employers opt-out, or fail to opt-in, digital contact tracing will not 
work as intended.149 
 The privacy notices given to employees are also at issue. If 
privacy notices are open-ended and broad, the resulting consent is 
less valid because it would be an agreement to a vague set of 
terms.150  Alternatively, if an employer provides excessive detail in 
privacy notices regarding the anticipated uses, procedures, and 
goals for the data, constructive consent is also not guaranteed 
because employees may be overwhelmed by the information given, 
 
145 Brown et al., supra note 110. 
146 Id. 
147 COVID-19’s Serious Risks for Economic Rights, Human Rights Watch (June 
29, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/29/covid-19s-serious-risks-
economic-rights#.  
148 John Egan, Contact-Tracing Apps Can Keep Tabs on Coronavirus, SHRM 
(May 12, 2020), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-
topics/technology/pages/contact-tracing-apps-can-keep-tabs-on-
coronavirus.aspx (referring to contact tracing applications as “safety devices.”).  
149 Chiara Farronato, et al., How to Get People to Actually Use Contact Tracing 
Apps, HARVARD BUS. REV. (July 5, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/07/how-to-get-
people-to-actually-use-contact-tracing-apps.  
150 Determann, supra note 13.    
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especially with a lack of legal experience.151  Moreover, according 
to a study by Deloitte, over ninety percent of people do not read 
privacy policies and other terms and conditions, citing complicated 
language and lack of meaningful choice in using the application or 
other digital platforms.152 In another study, researchers created a 
fake social networking application and wrote corresponding terms 
and conditions in which users would have to agree to give up their 
first born child; 98 percent of users agreed to the terms.153 The 
study suggested that privacy policies can take up to thirty minutes 
for users to read, and most people were not up to the task.154   
Moreover, employers may run into issues if they fail to explain 
privacy policies, or otherwise fail to provide adequate notice that 
they exist.  In Nguyen v. Barnes and Noble Inc., the Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that while failing to read policies is not a defense, entities 
that provide no notice, other than a conspicuous link to a set of 
policies, do not alone give users constructive notice of those 
policies.155  Thus, simply having a privacy policy for a contact 
tracing application, even one that sufficiently addresses the uses 
the data will be put to, is not enough to solicit meaningful consent.    
 
2.  Proximity Information and Data Quality  
 
Another criticism of digital contact tracing is that there is no 
consensus on how to standardize proximity data received from 
Bluetooth contact tracing mechanisms.156  Standardization of data 
 
151 Id.; see also Brooke Auxier et al., Americans’ Attitudes and Experiences with 
Privacy Policies and Laws, PEW RESEARCH. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-attitudes-and-
experiences-with-privacy-policies-and-laws/ (noting that only 9% of adults in 
the United States read privacy policies before agreeing to the terms).  
152 Caroline Cakebread, You’re Not Alone, No One Reads Terms of Service 
Agreements (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/deloitte-study-
91-percent-agree-terms-of-service-without-reading-2017-11.  
153 JONATHAN A. OBAR & ANNE OELDORF-HIRSCH, THE BIGGEST LIE ON THE 
INTERNET: IGNORING THE PRIVACY POLICIES AND TERMS OF SERVICE POLICIES 
OF SOCIAL NETWORKING SERVICES 12 (2018).   
154 Id. 
155 Nguyen v. Barnes and Noble Inc., 763 F.3d. 1171, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2014).  
156 Baird, Mermin-Bunnell & Lesandrini, supra note 136. 
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is the process of compiling different variables into one data set.157  
In this case, standardization is especially difficult when compiling 
confirmed positive cases of COVID-19, and symptoms reported by 
individuals without positive results, as well as compiling proximity 
data and data relating to the duration of exposure.158  Additionally, 
it is especially difficult to compile accurate data to identify 
exposure to asymptomatic cases, because asymptomatic patients 
are less likely to confirm that they are positive for COVID-19.159  
This makes the accuracy and reliability of contact tracing data 
variable at best.160  Additionally, whether contact tracing 
applications will rely on objective or subjective data is relevant in 
determining the accuracy of contact tracing mechanisms.161  Using 
subjective data, such as the self-reporting of symptoms and 
suspected cases of COVID-19, dampens the accuracy of contact 
tracing because it is unclear whether those cases are positive or 
not.162  However, using only objective data, such as authenticated 
test results puts the onus on people to get tested for COVID-19, 
whether or not they have symptoms.163   
 The quality of information received by contact tracing 
applications is further at issue for being overprotective.164  
 
157 Jim Frost, Standardization, 
https://statisticsbyjim.com/glossary/standardization/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2020).  
158 Baird, Mermin-Bunnell & Lesandrini, supra note 136. 
159 Caroline Chen, America Doesn’t Have a Coherent Strategy for Asymptomatic 
Testing. It Needs One, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 1, 2020), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/america-doesnt-have-a-coherent-strategy-for-
asymptomatic-testing-it-needs-one (noting that asymptomatic patients were less 
likely to get tested and that there was no coherent strategy to test asymptomatic 
patients).  
160 Ashkan Soltani, Ryan Calo & Carl Bergstrom, Contact tracing apps are not a 
solution to the COVID-19 crisis, Brookings (Apr. 27, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/inaccurate-and-insecure-why-contact-
tracing-apps-could-be-a-disaster/.  
161 Baird, Mermin-Bunnell & Lesandrini, supra note 136. 
162 Id.; What are common misconceptions about contact tracing? (last updated 
Oct. 24, 2020), https://covid19.nj.gov/faqs/nj-information/slowing-the-
spread/what-are-common-misconceptions-about-contact-tracing#direct-link 
(suggesting that New Jersey’s exposure notification application will only use 
positive test results when notifying close contacts).  
163 Baird, Mermin-Bunnell & Lesandrini, supra note 136. 
164 Cuomo Debuts New Contact Tracing, COVID Alert App as New York Battles 
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Bluetooth signals can travel through walls, and as long as users are 
within six feet of each other, the contact tracing application will 
log the proximity data even though there is no risk of COVID-19 
transmission.165  On the other hand, when a user that does not 
receive alerts through the application when someone with COVID-
19 was nearby, either because the application does not use push 
notifications or alerts or because there have been no reported cases 
within six feet of the user, a false sense of security may arise and 
users may feel less of a need to take precautions, such as using 
PPE or staying home from work when experiencing symptoms.166   
At work, employees may also choose or be required to leave their 
phones in another location, may turn their phones off during 
meetings or working hours, may experience bad Wi-Fi connection 
or signal during work, or may simply forget to charge their phone 
or bring their phone to work on any given day.167  In these 
situations, a digital application would also be ineffective.    
 These accuracy problems cannot be solved by applications 
alone; most applications being developed create identification 
numbers for users that are not traceable, and there can be no way to 
verify accuracy.168  Thus, there is a sizable risk of inaccurate 
proximity data.  
 
3.    Information Use and Sharing 
 
 Much of the worry regarding contact tracing applications is 
the potential for sharing data to third parties, including advertising 
companies or law enforcement agencies, as well as the theft or loss 
 
Clusters, NBC N.Y. (Updated Oct. 2, 2020), 
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/coronavirus/cuomo-debuts-new-contact-
tracing-covid-alert-app-as-new-york-battles-clusters/2646436/.  
165 Id.; Teresa Scassa, Jason Millar & Kelly Bronson, Privacy, Ethics, and 
Contact Tracing Apps, VULNERABLE: THE LAW AND POLICY OF COVID-19, 6 
(Colleen M. Flood et al. eds., 2020) (citing Rob Kitchin, Using Digital 
Technologies to Tackle the Spread of the Coronavirus: Panacea or Folly, 
MAYNOOTH UNIV. (Apr. 21, 2020). 
166 Soltani, Calo & Bergstrom, supra note 160.  
167 White et al., supra note 99. 
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of data.169  However, many information privacy and data 
protection concerns related to digital contact tracing are not new.  
People have already become comfortable with opting into the 
location services of various applications, for example, and share 
personal data with applications and websites on a daily basis that 
can then be sold to advertisers or other third parties.170  Digital 
contact tracing applications create the same risks for users; without 
sufficient controls, a log of a user’s proximity to other users, as 
well as users’ health status, can be used and disclosed to third 
parties.171  Although individuals may be comfortable giving up 
information on other digital applications, they may not be willing 
to share their information when it involves their health.172 
 PII has long been protected by statutes such as the ADA 
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”).173  However, HIPAA typically does not apply in the 
employment context because it only concerns “covered entities,” 
which include health care providers, health plans, and healthcare 
clearinghouses.174  Most employers do not qualify as covered 
 
169 Adam Schwartz, Two Federal COVID-19 Bills: A Good Start and a Misstep, 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 28, 2020), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/05/two-federal-covid-19-privacy-bills-good-
start-and-misstep; see also Todd Ehret, Data Privacy Laws Collide With Contact 
Tracing Efforts; Privacy is Prevailing, REUTERS (Jul. 21, 2020), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-data-privacy-contact-tracing/data-
privacy-laws-collide-with-contact-tracing-efforts-privacy-is-prevailing-
idUSKCN24M1NL (noting that the Federal Bureau of Investigations has 
reported an increase in cyber-attacks during the COVID-19 pandemic).  
170 Andrew Crocker, Kurt Opsahl, & Bennett Cyphers, The Challenge of 





173 White et al., supra note 99. 
174 Id.; Covered Entities and Health Associates, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/covered-
entities/index.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). It also applies to “business 
associates,” which are defined as any third parties that help a covered entity 
carry out its functions, including organizations that transmit PII to Covered 
Entities; White et al., supra note 99.  
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entities or business associates.175  Besides the protection offered by 
the ADA, there is a competing legal obligation to report notifiable 
diseases to public health agencies such as the CDC and state-
specific agencies.176  Such reported information has traditionally 
been “kept private by public health agencies and then reported in 
the public domain either in aggregate or in other non-identifiable 
ways.”177  However, the use of a third-party application, and more 
specifically a contact tracing application, can disrupt the fine line 
between privacy and reporting requirements.  A few questions 
arise, including who holds the right to access digital contact tracing 
information, whether the information could impact insurance rates 
or access to resources, for example, and whether work 
requirements will be affected for those who test positive for 
COVID-19.178 
 
B. Potential for Discrimination and Lack of Accessibility 
 
 The potential for employment discrimination on the basis 
of COVID-19 infection, other related effects of the virus, or the 
refusal to use an application is important to consider in addition to 
information privacy and data protection concerns.  With the use of 
contact tracing applications by employers, there may be risks of 
denied benefits and lack of workplace access for those who refuse 
to give consent to share their data or use a particular contact 
tracing application.179  If the use of a contact tracing application is 
voluntary, employers can make it an opt-in or opt-out system in 
which employees will decide for themselves if they wish to 
participate.180  Although this will give employees more decision-
making ability and independence, without sufficient anti-
discrimination mechanisms in place, this may prevent a sufficient 
number of people from opting-in or entice a large number of 
 
175 White et al., supra note 99. 
176 Baird, Mermin-Bunnell & Lesandrini, supra note 136. 
177 Id.; White et al., supra note 99. 
178 Baird, Mermin-Bunnell & Lesandrini, supra note 136. 
179 Schwartz, supra note 169.  
180 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (describing opt-in and opt-out 
mechanisms).   
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employees to opt-out.181  Employees may fear that their health 
status will exclude them at work, or deny them benefits consistent 
with working at the office.182  For example, employees who test 
positive for COVID-19 may fear the stigma associated with it, and 
consequently fear that they will be excluded from attractive work 
opportunities183, as employers may use health information to 
“refrain from hiring, retaining, or promoting job candidates.”184 
If data is not sufficiently protected from theft or misuse, employers 
could be at risk for receiving higher rates for health, life, and 
disability insurance, banks could use it to make loan decisions, and 
landlords and housing associations could use the data to make 
tenant decisions.185  
 Other access-related concerns arise as well.  Individual 
employees may not have cellphones with the capability of 
downloading and using a contact tracing application.186  The 
application may also lack accessibility to people who are visually 
impaired, speak a different language, or are otherwise not familiar 
with legal jargon.187  The August 2020 CCPA regulations provide 
that privacy notices must accommodate individuals with 
disabilities and those who speak languages other than English, but 
other proposed bills do not explicitly mandate this.188 
 
C. Inadequate Protections by the ADA  
 
 
181 N.F. Mendoza, Data researchers at odds: Will Americans opt in or opt out of 
COVID-19 contact tracing apps?, TECHREPUBLIC (May 22, 2020), 
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/data-researchers-at-odds-will-americans-
opt-in-or-out-of-covid-19-contact-tracing-apps/ (discussing a study in which 46 
to 48 percent of Americans said they would opt out of using a contact tracing 
application).  
182 Baird, Mermin-Bunnell & Lesandrini, supra note 136. 
183 Social Stigma Associated with COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/covid19-stigma-
guide.pdf.    
184 Determann, supra note 13.    
185 Id.    
186 Scassa, Millar & Bronson, supra note 165.  
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188 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text; see discussion supra Sections 
I.A.3, I.A.4 for information about state and federal information privacy bills.  
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Although EEOC guidance and the ADA govern, the EEOC has 
stated that its laws do not interfere with guidance issued by the 
CDC or local public health agencies regarding steps that employers 
should take to protect their workplace.189  The changing guidance 
from health agencies and the unclear hierarchy between EEOC 
guidance and directions issued by public health authorities creates 
an unclear question for employers as to which guidance reigns 
supreme.  Further, the EEOC’s lack of direction about whether 
COVID-19 will be considered a disability under the ADA is 
leaving a gap open for abusive practices, considering that non-
disabilities are not protected to the same extent.190  In Cossette v. 
Minnesota Power & Light, the Eighth Circuit held that a plaintiff 
need not be disabled to state a claim for the unauthorized gathering 
or disclosure of confidential medical information under the 
ADA.191  However, plaintiffs must also establish that a violation of 
the ADA caused tangible injury.192  Because the misuse of 
confidential health information is not enough, employees may have 
a difficult time establishing tangible injury if they are 
discriminated against or their information is misused.  
While they provide helpful guidance, EEOC publications 
do not address whether employers may mandate the use of digital 
contact tracing.193  Employers are allowed to make disability-
related inquiries and submit employees to medical examinations 
including mandatory COVID-19 testing and temperature scans 
before entering the workplace, because the pandemic was 
classified as a direct threat.194  Additionally, the EEOC relied on 
CDC guidance and noted that employers may prevent employees 
from coming to work if they test positive or have symptoms of the 
virus.195  Because of the allowance of certain medical 
examinations, and its endorsement by the CDC, it is likely that 
 
189 What You Should Know About COVID-19, supra note 97. 
190 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, DISABILITY 
DISCRIMINATION [hereinafter EEOC Disability Discrimination] 
https://www.eeoc.gov/disability-discrimination (last visited Nov. 18, 2020). 
191 Cossette v. Minnesota Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 969-70 (8th Cir. 1999).  
192 Id. 
193 Brown et al., supra note 110. 
194 Id.; see supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
195 Id.  
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contact tracing is permissible under EEOC law, provided that it has 
not been expressly prohibited and does not constitute a medical 
examination that is more extensive than temperature checks or 
mandatory COVID-19 testing.   
However, the most unclear aspect of the guidance released 
by the EEOC is that employers may follow the advice of local 
health agencies and the CDC regarding information needed to 
permit an employee’s return to the workplace after travel.196 
Employers may also mandate doctor’s notes for employees who 
say they cannot return to work.197  In regard to the latter, the EEOC 
conceded that employees may need to rely on mechanisms other 
than healthcare professionals, who are generally busy during the 
pandemic, to generate an equivalent to a doctor’s note.198 It is 
unclear what an equivalent to a note from a medical professional 
is, and employers would have the power to decide what they will 
accept. 
Employers must keep medical information confidential 
under the ADA, but the EEOC has stated that an employer may 
disclose the names of employees who test positive to OSHA.199  
However, assuming that a digital contact tracing application would 
broadcast and receive anonymous “pings” or proximity data, it 
would likely not be considered a disability inquiry under the ADA, 
because the numbers would not reveal employees’ medical 
information.200 Because this data is thus not protected by the ADA, 
it has the potential for abuse, especially if applications fail to 
sufficiently anonymize the data. The potential for abuse is twofold 
for applications that transmit data to the employer rather than 
keeping it on the user’s phone in a decentralized manner.201  
The EEOC’s guidance implies that employers can ask 
employees to disclose whether employees received an exposure 
 
196 Id. 
197 Id.  
198 Id.   
199 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, REVISED 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE FOR RECORDING CASES OF CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 
2019 (COVID-19) (2020), https://www.osha.gov/memos/2020-05-19/revised-
enforcement-guidance-recording-cases-coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19.  
200 Brown et al., supra note 110. 
201 See supra notes 118-23.  
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alert notifying them that they were in close contact with COVID-
19.202  This has the potential for abuse, especially if employees ask 
about exposure alerts employees may have received when they 
were out of the office.203 When employees receive an exposure 
alert, they may not know whether the exposure occurred in or out 
of the office because it will have been received after the exposure 
took place.204  
Moreover, it is unclear if COVID-19 would be considered a 
disability under the ADA.  Long-term effects of COVID-19 may 
include illnesses that would otherwise be considered statutory 
disabilities under the ADA,205 as long as they substantially limit 
one or more major life activities, the individual suffering from 
such impairment has a record of it, or is regarded as having such 
impairment.206 A major life activity can include the operation of a 
major bodily function.207  The CDC has advised that long-term 
complications may severely affect cardiovascular, respiratory, 
renal, neurological, and cognitive functions to an extent yet 
unknown.208 In some cases, patients suffered from permanent 
neurological damage and up to 40 percent of patients may suffer 
some neurological impairment, ranging from subtle changes in 
cognition to encephalitis, stroke, and dementia.209  Moreover, 
many people who passed away from COVID-19 did not show 
neurological damage when they became infected, but later had 
brain damage when autopsies were performed.210  Many of the 
potential conditions resulting from COVID-19 are permanent, and 
would otherwise be classified as disabilities.211  However, the 
 
202 Id. 
203 Id.  
204 Id.  
205 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) 
206 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) 
207 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) 
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209 Andrew M. Budson, The Hidden Long-Term Cognitive Effects of COVID-19, 
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EEOC has failed to classify COVID-19 itself as a disability, 
leaving discrimination law under the ADA in limbo in regard to 
the pandemic.  
Finally, the ADA does not presently prevent an employer 
from requiring employees to upload their list of “keys,” or their 
sequence of randomly generated numbers which can show close-
contact exposure.212  Additionally, the CDC issued guidance 
stating that employers should inform the close contacts and other 
employees within the workplace if an employee tests positive.213  
While this should be anonymous, and the positive employee’s 
name should not be given, the employee who tested positive will 
be missing from work during their quarantine, and thus their 
anonymity may be surrendered anyway.214  This has potential for 
discriminatory practices, abuse, and associated stigma. 
 
III. CONTACT TRACING AND PRIVACY OF HEALTH INFORMATION IN 
HARMONY 
 
 Although digital contact tracing implicates a number of 
privacy concerns, it is an invaluable tool for the control and 
eradication of viral outbreaks in the world at large.  It is especially 
important that effective, yet secure, contact tracing can be used in 
the workplace to mitigate the effects of a pandemic on the 
economy and to ensure that businesses can stay open safely.  
Therefore, there must be a careful balancing to ensure that privacy 
concerns are mitigated, and digital contact tracing can be used in 
the workplace.  Part III.A discusses why COVID-19 should be 
classified as a disability under the ADA, Part III.B endorses the 
PHEPA bill, Part III.C encourages states to pass broader privacy 
laws encompassing the FIPPs, and Part III.D discusses policies in 
the workplace which may make contact tracing safer and more 
effective.   
 
A. Making COVID-19 a Disability under the ADA 
 
 
212 Id.  
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 Much is still unknown about COVID-19 and its effects on 
the body.215  The virus can present mild to no symptoms in some, 
and severe symptoms necessitating the need for hospitalization, 
intensive care, and the use of ventilators in others.216  The risk of 
death or serious illness from COVID-19 increases with age, as well 
as for people with underlying conditions, such as diabetes, lung 
disease, obesity, and heart disease.217  Although the ADA does not 
specifically list disabilities covered under it, long-term and chronic 
conditions are typically considered disabilities as long as the 
illness is a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more major life activities,” the individual suffering from 
such impairment has a record of it, or is regarded as having such 
impairment.218   
 
4.  COVID-19 Fits the Statutory Definition of a Disability 
 
The definition of “disability” is broadly construed in favor 
of covering individuals to the maximum extent permitted under the 
ADA.219  Under this definition, many underlying conditions that 
may subject one to severe symptoms of COVID-19 are considered 
disabilities under the ADA.220  A virus like COVID-19 making 
those conditions worse, or subjecting one to severe symptoms 
because of those disabilities, should also be considered a disability 
in these conditions.  
However, COVID-19 can and should be labelled a 
disability on its own, without the existence of pre-existing 
conditions.  Due to the potential and high-risk for serious long-
term conditions, many of which can be categorized as disabilities 
on their own under the ADA, COVID-19 infection should itself be 
considered a disability.  It would be proper to do so, as COVID-19 
 
215 See generally Kathy Katella, 5 Things Everyone Should Know About the 
Coronavirus Outbreak, YALE MEDICINE (Nov. 17, 2020), 
https://www.yalemedicine.org/stories/2019-novel-coronavirus (explaining what 
is known about the virus); see supra notes 208-211 and accompanying text.  
216 See supra notes 209-211 and accompanying text.  
217 See supra notes 209–211 and accompanying text.  
218 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.  
219 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). 
220 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A); see supra note 205 and accompanying text.  
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easily fits the first prong of the disability definition prescribed by 
the ADA.  COVID-19 is a physical and mental impairment that 
causes difficulty breathing, impaired cognition, or “brain fog,” 
fatigue, muscle and joint pain, and a range of long-term 
conditions.221 These include neurological, musculoskeletal, 
respiratory, cardiovascular, immune, and circulatory conditions 
and suffice as physical and mental impairments.222 All of these 
listed impairments are symptoms and effects of COVID-19 in a 
large number of people.  Moreover, one need not have these 
symptoms to be considered physically or mentally impaired; it is 
enough that an employer may believe an employee has one or 
more of these impairments stemming from prior COVID-19 
infection.223   
COVID-19 also substantially limits one or more major life 
activities, because its symptoms and effects on the body may 
prevent people from going to work, from getting out of bed, and 
from living with the full use of their organs due to the burden of 
the virus on such organs.224  Even if an employee is not actively 
exhibiting symptoms of these impairments, they may still reach the 
threshold for substantial limitation of a major life activity.225  
Because COVID-19 substantially limits the use of bodily 
functions,226 and substantially limits major life activities, it meets 
the first prong of the definition of “disability” under the ADA.227  
 
 
221 Long-Term Effects, supra note 209; see supra notes 208–211 (discussing 
long-term conditions of the virus).  
222 See supra notes 208–211.  
223 See supra note 83 and accompanying text (noting that it is enough that an 
employer regards an employee as having a disability).  
224 See supra note 207 and accompanying text (noting that the disruption of a 
major bodily function can be a major life activity).   
225 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998); see supra note 87 and 
accompanying text.  
226 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv). 
227 Note that the word “major” is not interpreted strictly to create a demanding 
standard for disability, and is not determined by reference to whether the activity 
is of “central importance to daily life.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(2).  
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5. Making COVID-19 a Statutory Disability would Protect 
Employees from Discrimination  
 
Under the ADA, qualified individuals with disabilities are 
protected from unfavorable treatment by their employers.228  
Individuals with a history of a disability, or those believed by their 
employers to have a physical or mental impairment lasting six 
months or more, even if they do not have such impairment, are also 
protected.229  The ADA protects such individuals from unfavorable 
treatment including selective hiring, firing, pay disparity, job 
assignment, promotions, layoffs, training, benefits, and other 
conditions of employment, as well as harassment for such 
disability or impairment.230  If COVID-19 was labelled a disability 
under the ADA, individuals who contract it would be protected 
from unfair employment practices.  This is especially important 
considering that digital contact tracing applications may notify 
employers when someone contracts the virus as it will have to be 
recorded and reported to public health agencies and to OSHA.231  
Further, individuals with disabilities are due reasonable 
accommodations, such as the ability to work from home for 
individuals with COVID-19 infections.232   
 
B.  Passing the PHEPA with FIPPs 
 
 The CCDPA and PHEPA apply to covered entities, which 
are entities that engage in contact tracing or exposure notification 
mechanisms.233  Each bill requires covered entities to take steps to 
ensure privacy before and after collecting covered data and creates 
 
228 EEOC Disability Discrimination, supra note 190.  
229 Id.  
230 Id.  
231 See supra note 199 and accompanying text; OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, OSHA INJURY AND ILLNESS RECORDKEEPING AND 
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, https://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/ (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2020).   
232 EEOC DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION, supra note 190.  
233 JONATHAN M. GAFFNEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10501, “TRACING 
PAPERS”: A COMPARISON OF COVID-19 DATA PRIVACY BILLS (2020); see 
discussion supra section I.A.4. 
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enforcement mechanisms to ensure that entities comply with their 
obligations.234  However, major differences arise between the 
CCDPA and the PHEPA bills in regard to the data that is covered.   
 
6.  The PHEPA Should be Passed Instead of the CCDPA 
 
The CCDPA insufficiently covers data collected by contact 
tracing applications, as it applies to the most narrow set of data, 
including only precise geolocation data, proximity data, persistent 
identifiers—or information that can identify individual users—and 
personal health information.235  The CCDPA also excludes data 
collected by covered entities concerning anyone “permitted to 
enter a physical site of operation of the entity,” including 
employees.236  The PHEPA, on the other hand, would protect any 
information actually linked or reasonably linkable to individuals or 
devices that is collected, processed, or transferred as part of a 
digital contact tracing mechanism, and applies to all exposure 
notification mechanisms, not just those related to the COVID-19 
pandemic.237  The PHEPA similarly protects a greater range of 
data, and creates a private right of action for violations, which the 
CCDPA fails to do.238  The PHEPA provides more protection for 
the privacy of employee’s medical data and information received 
from digital contact tracing applications.239   
 
7.     Enforcing the FIPPs 
 
 The PHEPA also more broadly encompasses the FIPPs, 
which offer higher protection for information collected through 
 
234 See discussion supra section I.A.4. 
235 See discussion supra section I.A.4. 
236 See discussion supra section I.A.4.; S. 3663, 116th Cong. § 10 (2020). 
237 GAFFNEY, supra note 233. 
238 Id.  
239 Suzan DelBene, Combatting COVID While Protecting Privacy: the Public 
Health Emergency Privacy Act (PHEPA), 
https://delbene.house.gov/uploadedfiles/public_health_emergency_privacy_act_
-_one_pager.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2020); Proposed Federal Privacy 
Legislation Tackles COVID-19 Data, JD SUPRA (May 22, 2020), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/proposed-federal-privacy-legislation-10027.  
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digital contact tracing applications. The PHEPA operates on an 
opt-in consent model, in which users of contact tracing 
applications would have to affirmatively consent to the use of their 
data, and have the ability to revoke consent at any time, after 
which the employer would have to destroy the data and prevent it 
from being used or shared.240 PHEPA also satisfies the 
access/participation principle, as it provides that there must be a 
reasonable attempt at ensuring the accuracy of data, and 
individuals must have the ability to correct their data.241 The bill 
also stipulates that there must be reasonable safeguards to protect 
the confidentiality and security of data,242 that data must be 
destroyed after the COVID-19 emergency is terminated, and that 
data should not be linked to individuals in a way that would 
identify them,243 thus satisfying the integrity/security principle. 
The notice/awareness principle is met in § 3(e), requiring that 
organizations collecting, using, or disclosing health data should 
provide a clear and conspicuous privacy policy that describes how 
and for what purpose the data is collected, to whom it is disclosed, 
and the purpose of its disclosure.244 It also specifies that the 
privacy policy must describe the organization’s data retention and 
security policy, and explain how individuals can file complaints 
and exercise their rights under the proposed act.245 Finally, the 
enforcement/redress prong is met in § 6, where it describes how 
states, the FTC, and private citizens can seek redress for data 
breach.246 Outside of the FIPPs, PHEPA also allows for data 
minimization and anti-discriminatory practices.247 
 The CCDPA, on the other hand, does not meet the 
minimum standards under the FIPPs, and fails to cover a wide 
range of data, including data collected by employers.248 Its state 
 
240 Schwartz, supra note 169; H.R. 6866 §§ 3(d), 3(d)(2)(A). 
241 H.R. 6866 § 3(a)(2); see discussion supra section I.A.4. 
242 H.R. 6866 § 3(b); see discussion supra section I.A.4. 
243 H.R. 6866 §§ 3(g)(1)(A), 3(g)(2); see discussion supra section I.A.4.  
244 H.R. 6866 § 3(e); see discussion supra section I.A.4.  
245 H.R. 6866 § 3(e)(3), (4); see discussion supra section I.A.4.  
246 H.R. 6866 § 6; see discussion supra section I.A.4. 
247 H.R. 6866 §§ 3(a)(1), 3(a)(3); see discussion supra section I.A.4. 
248 Schwartz, supra note 169; S. 3663, 116th Cong. § 6(B)(iv) (2020); see 
discussion supra section I.A.4. 
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law preemption provision would “cut back” the legal rights of 
individuals in states with broad data privacy laws, including 
Californians under the CCPA.249  This would cut back rights to 
access data under the access/participation principle and prevent the 
right to delete or opt-out of data under the choice/consent 
principle.250 The CCDPA also lacks a private right of action, under 
the enforcement/redress principle, which would severely limit how 
individuals could get redress from data breach.251  
 
C. Passing State Information Privacy Laws Related to Contact 
Tracing 
 
 If Congress takes no action, information collected by 
digital contact tracing applications may be subject to state privacy 
regulations, which only exist in some states and often fail to offer 
full privacy protection.252 The CCPA is currently the most 
protective and broad statute governing the privacy of consumers, 
and other states should follow suit. State law should model 
California’s CCPA, or should be amended to expressly provide for 
a mandatory explanation of privacy policies and avenues for 
redress, the permitted use of subjective and objective data in 
contact tracing applications with accurate labels, the disallowance 
of GPS tracking, and a decentralized model for data storage.  
 
8. Adequate Application of the Notice/Awareness Principle  
 
Beyond a clear and conspicuous written privacy policy, a 
verbal explanation of privacy policies involving digital contact 
tracing applications should be available for employees to fully 
enjoy the notice/awareness principle under the FIPPs.  To ensure 
that users of digital contact tracing applications actually understand 
and know about the application’s privacy policies and avenues of 
redress in case of data breach or misuse, the policies should be 
 
249 See discussion supra section I.A.4. 
250 Schwartz, supra note 169; S. 3663, 116th Cong. § 3 (2020). 
251 Schwartz, supra note 169; see supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the CCDPA.  
252 See discussion supra section I.A.3. 
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conspicuous, clear, without legal jargon, and available to people 
with disabilities and those who speak different languages, just like 
the CCPA provides.253  Otherwise, the notice/awareness principle 
is implicitly violated, and users consequently cannot exercise their 
right to opt-in or opt-out.  
 
9.  Proximity Data Tracking and Storage 
 
The use of subjective data in digital contact tracing 
applications is another cause for concern.254 Subjective data, such 
as the self-reporting of symptoms, can increase applications’ 
inaccuracy, because it will be unknown whether those cases are 
positive or not.255 However, preventing users from submitting 
subjective data can impede contact tracing efforts when, in the 
event of COVID-19 test shortages or long lines at testing centers, 
employees are unable to get tested before displaying symptoms. A 
potential solution is to allow both subjective and objective data, 
including mere symptoms and official COVID-19 test results, but 
labelling them as such in the application. This way, employees will 
still be informed of potential and actual risk of COVID-19, while 
seeing the potential severity of the exposure.  
 Further, using Bluetooth rather than GPS tracking would 
preserve users’ information and prevent data breach and misuse.  
Although Bluetooth can be less accurate, as the signal can travel 
through walls and send employees false exposure notifications,256 
users’ locations are not logged as part of the mechanism, making it 
less likely that users will be tracked and their health information 
released or misused.257 With Bluetooth contact tracing, a user’s 
temporary identification number rotates frequently, preventing 
third parties from tracking individual users over time.258  
 
253 See supra notes 152–154 (noting that people typically do not read privacy 
policies); see supra note 188 (discussing the 2020 CCPA regulations).  
254 See supra notes 161–163 and accompanying text.  
255 See supra notes 161–163 and accompanying text. 
256 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.  
257 JASON BAY ET AL., BLUETRACE: A PRIVACY-PRESERVING PROTOCOL FOR 
COMMUNITY-DRIVEN CONTACT TRACING ACROSS BORDERS (2020).  
258 Id. 
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Alternatively, GPS accuracy decreases indoors, where risk of 
transmission is much higher, and entire buildings may fall within 
the reporting range of a single GPS point.259 Moreover, GPS 
tracking increases battery drain, which can curtail the accuracy of 
contact tracing in general.260  Further, there are other privacy 
concerns associated with GPS tracking.261 GPS tracking data 
consists of sensitive information about users’ activities and 
locations, most of which is unrelated to public health purposes.  
Any repository of such data can present an encroachment on 
individual privacy.262  Users can be identified with location 
tracking data, especially in sparsely populated areas where truly 
anonymizing data is futile.263  
 A decentralized model for contact tracing, in which the data 
stays on the user’s phone rather than being transmitted to another 
database, is ideal to preserve privacy and prevent misuse by 
malignant actors.264  Centralized systems operate with personal 
data, while the decentralized model will simply inform employees 
that they were exposed without offering information regarding 
where they were exposed, and from whom.265 
 
10. Collaboration with the EEOC and Public Health Agencies 
 
 Finally, there should be continuous collaboration between 
states, the EEOC, and public health agencies so that employers can 
receive up-to-date information and can amend their privacy 
policies accordingly.  In light of changing circumstances regarding 
 
259 Id.; Julian Sanchez & Matthew Feeney, Protect Privacy When Contact 
Tracing, CATO INSTITUTE: PANDEMICS AND POLICY (Sept. 15, 2020), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/pandemics-policy/protect-privacy-when-
contact-tracing#best-technologies-determining-location-proximity.  
260 BAY ET AL., supra note 257.  
261 Sanchez & Feeney, supra note 259.  
262 Id. 
263 Jessica Davis, COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps Spotlight Privacy, Security 
Rights, HEALTH IT SECURITY (May 20, 2020), 
https://healthitsecurity.com/news/covid-19-contact-tracing-apps-spotlight-
privacy-security-rights.  
264 See supra notes 118–123 and accompanying text.  
265 See supra notes 118–123 and accompanying text. 
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COVID-19, states should receive updated information to issue 
guidance for employers about the pandemic and where and how 
information about infected employees should be shared.  This will 
ensure that the notice/awareness principle is satisfied; employees 
can have updated privacy policies that match the guidance of the 
EEOC, the CDC, and local health agencies.   
 With these explicit additions to state and federal laws, 
digital contact tracing can offer far more protection to users and 
employees using digital contact tracing applications by informing 
users of exposure to COVID-19, while protecting their privacy and 
personal information.  
 
D. In the Workplace 
 
 Many employers may have had mixed feelings about 
smartphones in the workplace, considering they may be distracting 
for employees.  However, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and 
contact tracing efforts, employers should encourage employees to 
carry their phones with them wherever they go.  Additionally, to 
satisfy the notice/awareness and choice/consent principles,  
employers should verbally explain privacy policies as they are 
updated and amended.  This would further ease employees into 
understanding and constructively opting-in or opting-out of contact 
tracing applications.  
 Further, employers should collaborate with the CDC and 
other health departments to implement a preparedness and 
response plan to consider actions in the event of an outbreak, 
collect information in the workplace consistent with privacy 
considerations, and conduct workplace hazard evaluation and 
prevention activities to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in the 
workplace.266  Employers should also transparently communicate 
with their employees regarding privacy and anti-discrimination 
policies to allow employees to feel comfortable using digital 
contact tracing applications during work. 
 
 
266 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, CASE INVESTIGATION AND CONTACT 
TRACING IN NON-HEALTHCARE WORKPLACES: INFORMATION FOR EMPLOYERS 
(2020).  





 COVID-19 and the necessity of digital contact tracing 
applications has brought many privacy issues to light. However, 
these concerns do not end with the eradication or mitigation of 
COVID-19. There will likely be other pandemics and disease 
outbreaks in coming years due to human behaviors like 
deforestation and encroachment on diverse wildlife habitats.267  
With these behaviors, humans will come in contact with other 
species and facilitate the spread of coronavirus illnesses.268  
Because of these factors, it is imperative that the world as a whole 
establishes mechanisms for effective contact tracing without an 
irresponsible imposition on the privacy of individuals using the 
mechanisms. To be proactive, privacy concerns with contact 






267 Victoria Gill, Coronavirus: This is Not the Last Pandemic, BBC (June 6, 
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-52775386.  
268 Id. 
